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Abstract 
Studies of industry evolution are relatively scarce outside of industries defined by narrow 
technological bases. Studies of wholesaling are rarer still. These are curious features given 
that it is probable that service industries behave differently to manufacturing ones and that 
wholesaling is such a key function of many economies. This paper looks at the evolution of 
grocery wholesaling and grocery wholesalers in Ireland and Britain since 1930. It focuses on 
the processes and drivers of the wholesale industry. Similarities and differences between the 
two countries are discussed. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of government action as 
a triggering mechanism for change and on the role of trade associations and industry leaders 
in developing and following through on market and non-market strategies. The pathways of 
industry evolution identified differ from those seen in manufacturing. They therefore raise a 
number of issues for the development of understanding and conceptualisation in industry 
evolution studies. 
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THE EVOLUTION OF GROCERY WHOLESALING AND GROCERY 
WHOLESALERS IN IRELAND AND BRITAIN SINCE THE 1930s 
 
Introduction 
The study of industry evolution has attracted growing interest  among economists and 
management academics over the past twenty years, driven by the level of change experienced 
by many industries. The aim of this increasing body of research has been to develop models 
that explain the changes being observed. From this it is hoped that useful and practical help 
can be provided to practicing managers who struggle to manage the changes taking place.  
 
However, the research agenda, to date, has been limited at a number of levels. Firstly, there 
has been a much stronger focus on studying industry demographics and to some extent 
industry dynamics rather than full blown studies of structural evolution. Secondly, there has 
been a strong bias in the choice of industries studied. For the most part, manufacturing 
industries, particularly ones with a strong technology content have predominated.  The non-
manufacturing sector has been neglected, despite the growth of service industries and the 
prevalence and importance of distribution industries like wholesaling and retailing in the 
modern global economy. The outcome has been that our understanding of the process of 
industry level structural evolution has been limited. 
 
This paper looks to expand our understanding of industry evolution by reporting on research 
that compares the evolution of grocery wholesaling in both Britain and Ireland. The paper 
asks: what are the main explanatory drivers of industry evolution and can a pattern of process 
be observed?  By doing so it attempts to go some way towards redressing the research 
imbalance that currently marginalizes distribution industries.   
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 The Process of Industry Evolution 
Most of the empirical studies that have been conducted, to date,  have focused on 
manufacturing industries, particularly those defined by a narrow technological base. The 
outcome of this has been that the industry lifecycle has been identified, and remains, the main 
process model with empirical support. Industry lifecycle thinking has its origins in efforts to 
extend the product lifecycle to an industry level of analysis (Klepper, 1997).  Abernathy and 
Utterback’s (1975) seminal paper explained patterns of innovation by linking the technology 
lifecycle and the process of industry evolution. Underpinning this was the proposition that 
technology based innovation was the primary driver of the evolutionary process. Much of the 
subsequent evidence used to support the lifecycle concept was thus drawn from studies 
covering industries like automobiles, typewriters, automobile tires, commercial aircraft, 
televisions and penicillin (Klepper, 1997).   
 
However, the generic explanatory power of the lifecycle model (Abernathy and Utterback, 
1975) was quickly challenged by Pavitt and Rothwell (1976) on the basis that it was ‘not 
wholly consistent with  the different patterns of innovation observed’ (p. 377).  Porter (1980) 
questioned the possibility of a generic model of process and called for more attention on 
underlying drivers. Mowery and Nelson (1999) noted the dangers of relying too much on 
‘theories of industry life-cycles that focus on the evolution of limited product classes’; and 
highlighted the lifecycle model’s inability to explain the evolution of industries more widely 
defined than on a single technological base. Klepper (1997) observed that while the lifecycle 
concept works well in describing the formative eras of many industries, it does not capture 
fully the dynamics of the mature phase, particularly the issue of de-maturity. Furthermore, he 
also postulated that some industries do not, in fact, conform to the lifecycle model. The life 
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cycle stages of maturity and decline have proved particularly problematic. This can be seen 
when trying to explain the evolution of older industries, particularly those that provide basic 
necessities such as food and construction materials. Such industries can be seen to reach a 
“mature” stage but not decline (Grant, 2005). Despite all of these inherent weaknesses, 
McGahan et al (2004: 2) have recently observed that ‘the industry lifecycle model – is so 
widely accepted and its basic premises so taken for granted that it has become conventional 
wisdom in business’ 
 
There have been a number of attempts to expand the understanding of industry evolution 
outside of manufacturing.  Barras (1986) proposed the existence of a reverse lifecycle for 
service industries. He suggested that service industries do not experience a technology driven 
take-off or introduction phase. Instead, new technologies start out as a means of increasing 
the delivery efficiency of existing services. Over time the new technology is applied to 
improving the quality of service before finally moving on to assist in generating wholly 
transformed or new services. As such, where manufacturing industries experience product 
innovation followed by process innovation, service industries experience a cycle of 
incremental process innovation followed by radical process innovation and finally product 
innovation.  
 
This reverse lifecycle has found some support from Pandit and Cooke (2003) in their study of 
the British financial services industry and Aranda and Molina-Fernandes (2002) in their study 
of Spanish engineering consultancies. However, the reverse lifecycle has also been subjected 
to criticism. Langeard and Eiglier (1990) consider the model to be valid only for services 
with a substantial back-office. Petit (1990) sees the model’s main area of strength to be in 
household services, which have a significant level of self-service while Gallouj (1998: 14) 
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found it to be ‘less a theory of innovation in services than a theory of the spread of 
technological innovation from manufacturers to services’.  A more fundamental weakness, 
however, may be that Barras continues to focus on the role of technology rather than on a 
wider driver set. 
 
In the distribution field Fein (1998), in his evolutionary study of US drug wholesaling, 
demonstrated that wholesaling differs from manufacturing type industries, with pre-existing 
theories of change applying unevenly, if at all. These issues have been taken up by Quinn and 
Murray (2005) and Quinn and Leavy (2005) in their study of the evolution of wholesaling 
industries in Ireland, in which they reveal no evidence of life cycle and identify an expanded 
range of evolutionary drivers.   
 
It is clear that while lifecycle thinking offers a powerful way of explaining the process of 
industry evolution, within certain contexts it appears to be incomplete. McGahan et. al 
(2004), Ruef (2004) and Windrum (2005) have called for more fine grained studies of 
industries  at maturity and regeneration as a way of extending understanding of later 
evolutionary stages. Others (e.g. Utterback 1994, Klepper 1997, Fein 1998, Quinn and 
Murray 2005, Quinn and Leavy 2005) point to the need to expand the range of studies to non-
manufacturing industries such as wholesaling and retailing. This paper responds to these 
calls.  
 
Wholesaling as a Research Domain 
Over twenty years ago, Dawson and Moir (1985) concluded their review of wholesaling in 
Great Britain by noting that “within government and academic groups, there is little 
recognition of the importance of wholesaling, despite its key position in the dynamic economy 
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of distribution” (p20). They drew an important distinction between the acts and processes of 
wholesaling and the organisations that undertook these activities, some of which were 
wholesalers i.e. their primary function was wholesaling. They further note that “although the 
wholesaling sector is a major sector in the British economy, relatively little is known about 
the way it operates … but from observation it is clear that the sector is undergoing rapid 
change” (p20). 
 
In the intervening period, studies of wholesalers and wholesaling have become even less 
common. Rosenbloom attempted to breathe life into research on wholesaling in the USA, 
culminating in a 1994 special edition of the Journal of Marketing Channels (Rosenbloom 
1994). However, this effort has not been sustained. In the UK research on wholesaling 
became effectively non-existent. This lack of both interest and understanding may have 
occurred in part because wholesaling activities have increasingly been undertaken by 
manufacturers, retailers or other channel organisations such as logistics services providers 
(Dawson and Shaw 1989, Fernie and Sparks 2004). Wholesaling as a dynamic supply activity 
has become a battleground for competing power and efficiency stratagems of manufacturers 
and retailers. In many product sectors it would appear that wholesaling is of critical 
importance in performance terms, but that wholesalers have become less visible, probably 
less significant and thus of less importance to study. This is not to say that wholesaler 
numbers have been in decline in every product sector, but rather that their economic 
significance has shifted. In order to survive and prosper wholesalers and the wholesale sector, 
like wholesaling as an activity, have changed. This makes the study of the industry evolution 
of wholesaling important and potentially significant. 
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Dawson and Moir (1985) considered the British market. There is no doubt however that 
many of the changes and trends they identified occur also in other countries. There may be 
variation in the extent and timing of change by product sector and by country, but there is 
agreement that wholesale activities are increasingly blurred within supply and demand 
chains. Retailer-generated reconfiguration of supply systems in for example Japan, Korea, 
Poland, Spain or Ireland are affecting the stability and survival of traditional wholesalers, as 
well as affecting retail competition for consumers. There are thus comparative, international 
and global dimensions to research into wholesaling and wholesalers. 
 
Wholesaling is a large and wide-ranging sector of most economies. Not all product sectors 
within wholesaling are undergoing the same set of changes at the same time, though there 
may be some consistent themes in the long run (Quinn and Murray 2005; Quinn and Leavy 
2005). Grocery wholesaling is probably the largest wholesaling sector, and arguably the one 
most affected by change. Furthermore, whilst grocery wholesaling is important in itself, due 
to its scale and supply of products to meet basic needs, it is also significant because of the 
activities of major manufacturers and major retailers. As such the study of the grocery 
wholesaling sector potentially illuminates behaviours, affects, responses and futures for other 
wholesaling sectors. 
 
This paper attempts to present and account for industry evolution in grocery wholesaling in 
Ireland and Britain since the 1930s, focusing on drivers and processes. A long-run approach 
is taken in order to evaluate the inter-acting affects of activities, changes, legislation and 
power struggles. The paper is primarily concerned with grocery wholesalers, but as noted 
above, understanding changes in grocery wholesalers requires accounting for changes in 
wholesaling itself and those undertaking wholesaling activities. The paper also considers in 
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part about the changing nature of retailing and retail firms and their activities during this 
period. 
 
The paper is divided into four further sections. First, the approach and methodology are 
presented. Some of this has been noted elsewhere (Quinn 2002; Quinn and Murray 2005; 
Quinn and Leavy 2005; Quinn and Sparks 2006). Secondly,  a tabulated comparative 
synopsis of the case data is presented. Thirdly, a comparative discussion is provided. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
The Research Approach and Methodology 
This research seeks to explore how context, social action and history interplay in driving and 
patterning the process of evolution in wholesaling over time. In doing so it employs a 
qualitative methodology based on multi-modal and multi-level approaches, focused on a 
long-time period. Few templates are available to guide inductive research into the dynamics 
of industry evolution using such approaches. This study adopted an approach akin in method 
and perspective to the  contextualist research strategy developed for the Warwick studies on 
corporate change (Pettigrew 1987, 1990, 1997). It is thus informed by a number of principles: 
 Multiple levels of analysis were used to connect context, process and outcome; 
 An underlying theory of social action was employed; 
 A longitudinal case-based research design was employed to allow patterns of continuity 
and change to be observed over time. 
 
The data for Ireland were gathered primarily between 1997 and 2001, through archival 
material and personal interviews. The material reviewed included the minutes and records of 
industry associations, association newsletters, journal and publications; published and 
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unpublished company and industry reports; government publications; newspaper records; 
published and unpublished industry histories and biographies; and industry statistics from 
census and commentator reports. Fuller details can be found in Quinn (2002). 
 
The data for Britain were gathered primarily from 2002 to 2006 and, in essence, replicated 
the approach adopted in Ireland. Fewer interviews have been completed at this time and the 
research programme remains active in that regard. Data collection was enhanced by the 
considerable volume of secondary material available from both academic and archival 
sources (see appendix 1 for list of the academic sources not referenced elsewhere1). A 
particular trade source (the Institute of Grocery Distribution reports on Grocery Wholesaling, 
started in 1979 and published almost annually since) has been assembled as a complete data 
source in one place, apparently, for the first time. The main source used has been the trade 
magazine The Grocer (see similar use in Shaw et al 2004 and Alexander et al 2005), which 
has been read in its entirety from 1930 onwards with all references to wholesalers or 
wholesaling extracted to form a core part of the narrative of the full case2.   
 
Case based research offers special challenges for journal authors and readers. The richness 
and quantity of data available sits uneasily within the confines of most journal guidelines on 
space. That said, the academic world is producing an increasing body of rich case research 
that can contribute much to our understanding of the business world.  The dilemma is 
therefore finding a balance. Authors must find ways of presenting data in a way that captures 
the essence of their material and allows for sufficient ‘feel’ on the part of reader.  This can 
often entail making painful decisions that balance detail and conciseness.  This paper 
attempts to bridge this gap through a tabulated comparative synopsis that looks to provide 
sufficient data exposure for the reader together with a time line of events (Table 1).   
Table 1: Comparative Synopsis of the Case Studies: Grocery Wholesaling in Ireland and Britain since the 1930s 
BRITAIN IRELAND 
Starting Conditions 
 Approx 2,000 wholesalers with 120 larger ones 
 Both wholesalers and retailers are organised into local, 
regional and national associations.  The National Federation 
of Wholesale Grocers (NFWG) was established in 1918.  
 Wholesalers service a market where independent retailers  
have a 54% market share. The rest is divided between 
multiples (25%) and the Co-op (20%) 
 There was intense price competition throughout the 1920s and 
into the 1930s that led to significant margin erosion.  
 
Starting Conditions  
 Approx 300 wholesalers with 25 larger ones  
 They service a retail sector where independent retailers have 
75% of the retail market and multiples command the other 
25% 
 There was intense price competition throughout the 1920s and 
into the 1930s that led to significant margin erosion.  
 
1934 – 1945: Creating stable structures 
 The intensity of price competition creates pressure to bring 
order to the sector.  
 Manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers came together under 
the banner of the Grocery Proprietary Articles Council 
(GPAC) to enforce a system of Resale Price Maintenance. In 
1936 GPAC armed itself with rules and sanctions that would 
allow them to stop supplies to ‘errant’ traders i.e. price 
cutters. The restrictions of RPM were actively resisted by the 
large retail multiples and by the Co-operatives. 
 In 1937 the Shops (Retail Trading Safeguards) Bill  looked to 
restrict the growth of multiples and protect independent 
retailers. It failed due opposition from multiple and Co-
operative retailers and lack of support and political power 
from wholesalers and independent retailers. However, the 
growth of multiples and the Co-op slowed during the period. 
 WW2 brought shortages of goods and manpower, 
Government control of  prices and margins, and restrictions 
1932 – 1945: A consolidation of power 
 In 1932 a new government introduced a protectionist regime 
that affected the importation of many grocery items. This 
brought a new insularity to the sector that undermined 
competitiveness and allowed some to extract excessive 
profits. 
 Following a period of intense price competition, 
manufacturers’ trade associations looked to enhance  
profitability by pressing for lower distribution margins. In 
response, the largest wholesalers, formed the Association of 
Wholesale Grocers, Importers and Distributors (AWGID and 
75 smaller wholesale firms set up the Wholesale Grocers 
Association of Ireland (WGAI).  
 Wholesaler associations won better terms from manufacturers, 
stabilised prices and disciplined members who broke 
association rules. The end result was a rigidly controlled 
distribution system with tight control on pricing structures.  
 The Second World War brought price controls and rationing 
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on entry to the trade. GPAC focused on dealing with 
profiteering and assisting manufacturer members to maintain 
continuance of equitable distribution. The war favoured the 
independent sector  and enhanced and consolidated the 
wholesaler’s role. 
 
 A growing sense of grievance among retailers over terms and 
conditions of supply and margins saw the formation of the 
Retail, Grocery, Dairy and Allied Trades’ Association 
(RGDATA) in 1942. 
1946 – 1953: A build-up of tensions 
 Rationing was slowly dismantled before ending in 1954 
 The arrival of a new Labour government brought pressures for 
lower cost solutions in food distribution.  
 Self-service was introduced in 1947 and encouraged by 
government but was slow to grow due to a licensing 
requirement for the building materials required to enable it.  
 In 1947 a committee of inquiry was set up under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Justice Sir George Lloyd Jacob to 
investigate RPM.  The committee criticised the role of RPM, 
Trade Association behaviour and GPAC. 
 From the late 1940s tensions were building in the wholesaler 
– retailer relationship. Wholesalers were seen to be resisting 
reform, opposing retail buying groups and appropriating 
retailer margins.  Trade associations were central to 
maintaining a balance of power both within and between the 
various channel actors within the grocery sector. 
 A survey of wholesaler costs revealed that wholesalers net 
profit before tax was under 2%.  
 Trade associations played a significant role throughout the 
1950s in both promoting and retarding change. In 1953 
Charles Green, the NFWG  President, called for reform in 
wholesaling to reduce distribution costs and improve service 
to retailers. Herman Kent, the Secretary General of the 
Retailers Federation, called for closer co-operation between 
wholesaler and retailer to cut costs. 
1946 – 1953: A build-up of tensions 
 Rationing ended in the 1940s and pent-up demand was 
released. 
 New entrants emerged in both wholesaling and retailing, 
drawn by demand growth. These fell outside the existing 
structures and fermented a bout of price cutting.  
 Growing price competition confronted a wholesale sector that 
had become inefficient and vulnerable to competition.  
 RGDATA looked to ensure that wholesalers did not supply 
the newly emerging price-cutters. 
 Tensions grew as wholesalers sought to protect their margins 
in the face of cut-price retailing and mixed retail-cum-
wholesale trading. The wholesaler associations found it 
increasingly difficult to maintain price discipline amongst 
their members. WGAI, in particular found it difficult as its 
membership included firms who were both wholesaler and 
retailer. 
 Significant growth in branded goods and along with pre-
packed and processed foods led to an increase in the 
marketing activity of manufacturers, which they looked to 
fund through restructuring channel discounts, at the expense 
of wholesalers.  
 Government concerns about escalating food prices from the 
late 1940s led to the introduction of the Restrictive Trades 
Practices Act (1953) and the formation of the Fair Trade 
Commission (FTC). 
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 Visits to the USA organised by the Anglo-American Council 
and trade associations highlight the advantages of 
supermarkets, buying groups and group trading formats. 
However, wholesalers were slow in adopting new methods 
1954 – 1960: End of the old order and creating a new recipe 
 Manufacturers increased their marketing and product 
development activities and began to consolidate into larger 
groups. They also became less influenced by the need for 
RPM and GPAC.  
 Retailing changed profoundly, as the move to self-service 
accelerated. Larger outlets began to emerge. Consolidation 
through acquisition began to take place within the multiples. 
Aggressive expansion and development marked out chains 
such as Victor Value, Fine Fare, Tesco and Sainsbury. 
 The Co-op was the early pioneer in self-service with  a 40–1 
lead over independents in conversions..   
 It was a traumatic period for independent retailers with large 
numbers collecting under the banners of wholesaler voluntary 
groups and retailer buying groups.  
 New larger scale retailer buying groups were formed. The 
Private Grocers Merchandising Association (PGMA), Bulk 
Organised Buying (BOB) and Londis Grovisions had their 
origins in this period.   
 In wholesaling, voluntary symbol groups and the cash and 
carry format were introduced.. In 1954, Peter Keevil Ltd. of 
London became the  first wholesaler to introduce voluntary 
group trading. In 1957, Vye & Son of Ramsgate became the 
first cash and carry wholesaler. These changes in wholesaling 
attracted new entrants, among which were a number of larger 
companies such as Booker and ABF (Weston)  who would 
reshape the wholesaling landscape. 
 In 1956 a Restrictive Practices Act banned collective 
1954 – 1958: The ending of the old order 
 Cut-price competition continued to grow. 
 Channel tensions led to the formation of two retailer owned 
wholesale buying groups AND and MNC. 
 Early forms of self service began to appear. Self service was 
aided by the emergence of an emerging set of new product, 
process, materials handling and storage technologies. 
 The FTC investigation destabilised the sector and 
manufacturers took advantage of the instability to restructure 
channel discounts.   
 Rising tensions generated by indiscipline caused WGAI to  
break up.  The more prominent members joined with AWGID 
to form the Irish Wholesale Grocers Association (IWGA) 
which had 46 members. They excluded smaller wholesalers 
and mixed traders deemed to be undesirable. This weakened 
its position in the subsequent reorganisation of the wholesale 
sector.  IWGA was dominated by the larger wholesalers form 
AWGID and was led by  its former president Reggie Knight. 
Knight fought and won an  internal battle to direct the 
association’s efforts towards retaining the status quo and in 
doing so delayed the efforts for change in wholesaling. 
 The grocery sector was investigated by the FTC  and in their 
1956 report they recommended the abolition of Resale Price 
Maintenance (RPM). By 1958 it was abolished.   
 Pricing was now based on volume, not function and new 
manufacturer discount structures extended ‘wholesale prices’ 
to larger retailers and co-operatives.  
 The IWGA fought hard to retain the status quo. However, the 
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 By the end of 1960  wholesaling had been transformed.  It 
was generally believed that there were too many wholesalers 
and that it would be in their own interest if some of them 
merged. Also, the advent of voluntary group trading 
introduced new tensions into the Wholesalers Federation 
 
sentiment of government, manufacturing trade, and public 
opinion was now firmly on the side of change. The old era 
came to an abrupt end, Knight departed and a new generation 
of leaders willing to face the new realities took control of the 
IWGA. 
 
1961 – 1975: Building the new formula 
 GPAC was disbanded in 1961 and Resale Price Maintenance 
formally ended in 1964. 
 The rising cost of living and food prices kept the sector at the 
centre of both government and media attention.  
 The latter part of this period became a land-use planning 
battleground as local planning authorities struggled to come to 
grips with the emergence of  food superstores 
 The level of concentration increased significantly at retail 
level, driven by escalating competition generated by the 
multiples. While the number of multiple branches declined by 
a third the size of stores increased dramatically, with 101 
superstores opening between 1962 and 1975.  Likewise co-
operative branches fell by 45% and the number of 
independent food retailers almost halved. 
 Trading stamps became a controversial competitive tool for 
multiple retailers during the period.   
 The new wholesaling formats took hold and expanded their 
membership. Wholesalers increasingly joined voluntary 
groups or converted to cash and carry. By the mid 1960s 
Centra had over 30 wholesale members, MACE 27, SPAR 33, 
1959 – 1973: Finding and building a new formula 
 From the late 1950s the relative position of wholesalers 
declined due to the rise of multiple operated supermarkets and 
retail owned co-operatives and their direct supply by 
manufacturers.  
 The emergence of out-of town shopping centres facilitated the 
expansion of larger scale supermarkets  
 Throughout the 1960s, manufacturers backed the multiples 
through direct deliveries and higher discounts. 
 By the early 1960s, many of the leading wholesaling firms in 
the old order had closed. 
 The IWGA fought back by establishing a trading vehicle 
(EDL) to promote group trading. However, it met with little 
success due to the diverse abilities of its membership, along 
with the limited writ that it held over the sector.  
 Cash and carry wholesaling and voluntary group trading were 
introduced as the new “wholesaling” trading formats. Leading 
wholesalers such as Musgraves found their initial inspiration 
through study trips to British wholesalers. 
 In 1960 Musgraves became the first firm to form its own 
voluntary group trading structure and adopt the cash and carry 
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 Wholesalers unable to change or lacking sufficient scale either 
closed or were acquired. Merger and acquisition activity grew. 
Many took place between members of voluntary groups.  A 
number of larger scale  groupings emerged.  
 By the mid-1970s each of the major symbol groups became 
dominated by the interests of a particular large wholesaler. 
E.g. APT with Weston, SPAR with Linfood Holdings, VG 
with Wheatsheaf and MACE/Wavy Line with Booker.   
 Cash and carry was initially seen as a ‘temporary’ format for 
small grocers. However, from the mid-1960s it became a key 
area of development. Sites grew from 61 sites in 1961 to a 
peak of over 600 by 1971. Many were developed by voluntary 
group wholesalers. Nurdin and Peacock emerged as the 
leading operator.  
 In the late 1960s cash and carry operators began to form  
buying and marketing groups such as  ICCG, Big ‘N’ and 
NEWGA. Symbol group operators began to brand their cash 
and carry operations under separate brand symbols. APT 
under the Capital banner, SPAR under Value Centre, VG 
under Trademarkets and MACE under Keencost.  
 1971 marked the end of entrepreneurial growth in cash and 
carry. Subsequent growth came from larger organisations in a 
position to raise capital. By 1975 Booker McConnell, 
Warriner & Mason, Oriel and Linfood had create national 
networks. Restructuring saw the number of depots fall by 3% 
but floor area grew by 39%. Also, the top 10 firms now 
accounted for 60% of warehouse space.  
 At the end of the period 1,500 wholesalers were trading. 
About 250 significant firms existed. Eight firms had emerged 
with £100m. + turnovers. 
 In 1961 50+  small wholesalers, refused admission to EDL, 
formed NWGA as a buying group. 
 Seven wholesalers came together to operate the SPAR retail 
franchise and to create the Value Centre cash and carry chain. 
By 1973 these had come under common ownership as BWG 
Foods. Five other wholesalers formed an alliance to operate 
the MACE franchise.  
 The remaining EDL members gathered under the Centra 
symbol. By 1965 the IWGA ceased to exist. In 1971, 
following closures and defections, most of the remaining 
firms in EDL joined with the MACE franchise operators to 
form AND to launch the Keencost cash and carry chain.  
 Independent retail buying groups AND and MNC launched 
Londis and MNC as symbol groups. 
 Cash and carry expanded with Value Centre being operated 
by SPAR wholesalers and Keencost by AND/MACE. 
 By the early 1970s, the retail multiples had secured 33% of 
the market. Meanwhile the number of independent retailers 
had fallen sharply and would continue to decline. By the early 
1970s, the grocery wholesaling industry had been changed 
profoundly. The plethora of independent wholesalers had 
consolidated into four wholesaler groupings. Two of these, 
Musgraves and BWG, had clearly emerged as new  industry 
leaders. 
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1976 – 2005: Consolidation and evolution of the new order 
 There was a further decline in the independent retail sector 
and a corresponding decline in the position of grocery 
wholesalers. This was the outcome of relentless growth 
among multiples, facilitated by favourable planning and 
competition regulations, and changing consumer demands.  
 In 1977 Tesco led a switch from trading stamps to low pricing 
that changed the locus of supermarket competition.  
 In the late 1970s large multiples were suspected of using their 
market power to force unjustified discounts from 
manufacturers.  Wholesalers and smaller retailers believed that 
they were being unfairly disadvantaged by this action.  
 Independent retailers and wholesalers looked to influence 
government with a view to restricting the growth of the 
multiples. However, they lacked cohesion and proved 
ineffectual as their  trade associations had become 
increasingly toothless. In contrast, the multiples acted in 
consort and succeeded in convincing consumers and (the 
Thatcher Conservative) government that they were the 
‘consumers champion’.   
 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981) and the 
Office of Fair Trading (1985) confirmed the existence  of 
‘unfair’  discounts but chose not to act because multiples were 
believed to pass on the savings to customers. This bolstered 
the position of large multiple retailers.   
 Planning controls were liberalised during the 1980s and this 
stimulated the growth of multiples by allowing the 
development of out-of-town superstores.  
 Wholesaling consolidated through acquisitions and mergers, 
as many firms such as Weston, Ranks and RCA that entered 
wholesaling during the 1950s and 1960s decided to exit. 
Much of the consolidation was driven by Booker. In the late 
1974 – 2005: Consolidation and evolution of the new order 
 By 1974, wholesalers had substantial buying power through 
their respective groupings. They had also consolidated around 
the symbol group and cash and carry formats. 
 Cash and carry dominated and group trading declined in the 
1970s.  
 The industry consolidated throughout the period as Musgraves 
and BWG grew to control over 70% of  wholesaler sales. The 
remaining wholesalers in AND and NWGA eventually 
merged to form Aontas. Meanwhile, the retailer group MNC 
was acquired in 1984 by BWG while Londis continues to 
trade. 
 A series of government investigations during the 1970s 
confirmed that manufacturer deliveries to the retail multiples’ 
branches cost 3.8% more than similar drops to wholesalers, 
yet the wholesalers continued to gain little consideration for 
this. 
 During the 1970s and 1980s the leading retail multiples 
competed intensely for customers and new development sites, 
often at the expense of independent retailers. As the market 
became more competitive there were numerous firm exits, 
including Tesco, who had entered by acquisition in 1979. 
 In 1978, resentment boiled over. Michael Campbell of AND-
MACE led a boycott of a Nestlé-owned supplier, forcing it to 
concede extra margin. Buoyed up by this success, a new 
wholesale association, the Irish Association of Distributive 
Trades (IADT), was formed in 1979. By 1980, it had 
extracted extra discount from 26 leading suppliers and won a 
permanent injunction preventing Tesco from below cost 
advertising.   
 In 1982, pressure from IADT and the independent retailers 
association RGDATA triggered the introduction of new Local 
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 The survivors in wholesaling did so through a mixture of 
acumen and fortitude. Some post-1970 new entrants like 
Bestway, Dhamecha, Makro, Musgraves  and AG Parfett 
flourished in the new environment. In 2005 Bestway jumped 
the industry rankings with its acquisition of the major cash 
and carry chain Batleys. 
 Market leader Booker faced  strategic trauma in the late 1990s  
with the failure of a major structural reorganisation (Project 
Heartland). The company then exited both delivered 
wholesaling and food services.  The delivered business, was 
sold to Palmer & Harvey McLane while  food services was 
sold to the South African group Bidvest and renamed 3663 
Foodservice. Palmer & Harvey McLane then emerged as the 
leader in delivered wholesaling. There was continuing success 
for the surviving pioneers of voluntary group trading such as 
James Hall & Co., Capper & Co., A. F. Blakemore Ltd., C.J. 
Lang Ltd and Appleby and Westwood through their SPAR 
wholesale and retail activities 
 From the mid 1970s, grocery wholesaling initially gravitated 
towards the cash and carry format, reaching a peak of 74% of 
wholesale business in the early 1990s. However, the switch to 
convenience shopping revived the role of symbol group 
trading and delivered wholesaling, resulting in a marked shift 
back to 55%. Furthermore, deliveries by  cash and carry 
  In 1984, IADT allied itself with RGDATA, in a combination 
of wholesale and independent retail interests arguably without 
precedent in Europe. After an aggressive and often 
acrimonious ballet with successive governments in 1987, the 
alliance secured the protection they were looking for in a new 
Restrictive Practices (Groceries) Order. This effectively 
prohibited below cost selling.  
 During the 1980s the tide turned in favour of group trading. 
Musgraves re-segmented the market by introducing the  
SuperValu symbol for trolley shopping and Centra for 
convenience. Meanwhile, BWG developed SPAR as a 
convenience brand.  
 In 1990s BWG introduced EUROSPAR for trolley shopping 
and also acquired the MACE franchise and developed it as a 
second convenience brand 
 Beginning in the 1980s  cash and carry began to decline in 
favour of group trading. While it remained a significant 
format it increasingly focused on non-retail customers such as 
caterers, pubs and other grocery outlets. 
 The period from the early 1990s was generally good for 
symbol group trading and the wholesale sector.  The 
protection afforded by the 1987 Groceries Order gave 
independent retailers more confidence in their survival. Many 
began to upgrade their stores and tie their fortunes to the 
leading symbol groups, which in turn had clear strategies for 
their formats. 
 In 1997, Tesco re-entered the Irish market through the 
acquisition of Power Supermarkets and were followed soon 
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 The consolidation amongst wholesalers has had repercussions 
for group trading. In the early 1970s there were 21 symbols 
operated by over 100 wholesalers, with 14 having over 1000 
members. In 2005 there were 13 symbols with five having 
over 1000 members. Only SPAR and MACE are of substance. 
SPAR now functions through five wholesalers while MACE 
is operated by one.  New symbol groups such as Costcutter, 
Premier and Lifestyle/Scandia have appeared and developed 
strongly.  
 In the mid 1990s the liberalisation of planning was reversed 
and a new focus placed on town centre development. The 
multiples were forced to take a renewed look at smaller urban 
sites and this generated a rapid move into convenience stores 
and other local formats. This was accelerated  by  major 
takeovers, as in the case of Tesco. Such outlets now  compete 
directly with voluntary group formats and other convenience 
stores .  
 The Federation of Wholesale Distributors (FWD)  and the 
Association of Convenience Stores both opposed  the Tesco 
convenience takeovers. Together they lobbied hard for the 
current Competition Authority investigation into grocery 
retailing. 
 The more recent findings of a Competition Commission 
(2000) inquiry into the industry, which looked for evidence of 
"monopolies that appear to operate against the public", 
suggested once again that little action would be taken against 
the leading retail businesses. Independent investigations into the 
industry have tended to conclude that while UK food retailers 
may use their power to “exploit” manufacturers and suppliers, 
the practice is good for the consumer because savings tend to 
be passed on through lower prices. As such, the government 
after by Aldi and Lidl.  
 Economic prosperity and changing life styles also played a 
part. Unprecedented year-on-year growth in disposable 
incomes, an increase in both single households and married 
couples in the workforce led to resurgence in demand for 
convenience shopping. It also fuelled a dramatic expansion in 
the catering sector as eating out became a significant activity 
for a cash rich and time poor population. These trends helped 
to fuel a recovery in the position of wholesaling and 
wholesalers. Irish grocery wholesalers came to control over 
40% of the national grocery market. 
 By 2005 however the long-term pressure on the 1987 
Groceries Order and concerns about high prices in Ireland 
brought about a review of its impact. In November 2005 the 
Groceries Order was abolished, although there remain 
restrictions on predatory pricing, enforceable via competition 
authorities. The outcomes of this step for the independent 
retail sector and its wholesaling symbol group managers are 
yet to be seen. 
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has not been minded to institute any remedies, fearing being 
accused of raising prices for consumers. A further inquiry 
announced in Spring 2006 will test this situation again. 
 With the growth in the convenience sector  the prospects for 
group trading looks reasonable. The recent acquisition of 
Londis by Musgraves and their decision to return their 
Budgen chain stores to independent ownership mean that 
further developments in group trading may lie on the horizon 
 
 
Discussion of the Cases 
In examining the totality of change in the two countries, a similar phase pattern can be seen to 
emerge. While the phase progressions were clearly not as sharply defined as the time line 
aspect of the tabulated comparative synopsis, in both industries broadly similar evolutionary 
patterns have been followed, and in relatively synchronised time frames. These phases are 
reflected in the case table, mapped in Figure 1 and can be considered in the sequence in 
which they are observed. 
 
Structural Reinforcement 
During the 1930s grocery wholesaling was in the midst of a phase of structural 
reinforcement. In both countries leading firms were trying to re-establish stable trading 
structures and build clear demarcation lines around existing structures. This was characterised 
by the efforts to preserve and strengthen the existing industry structure in the face of 
emerging pressures for change. While there are specific differences between the two 
countries the aim is similar and the reliance on trade associations of varying kinds is shared. 
The war years served to enhance existing structures and make them more embedded. Actions 
were aimed at ensuring that the grip of the existing wholesale industry leaders continued to 
hold sway. The pressures for change remained below breakthrough level.    
 
Structural Tension 
During the early post-war years, there was a new phase of growing structural tension, 
characterised by the escalation of both change and reactionary pressures. Grocery wholesaler 
leaders intensified their efforts to protect and strengthen existing structures, individually and 
through trade association activity. Sector norms had become firmly established in areas such 
as the supply of goods, price structure, method and degree of competition and trading format. 
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At the same time, the pressure for change in and around the industry was rising. Relations 
between retailers and wholesalers became more fractious in Ireland as both wholesalers and 
retailers adopted a more distrustful approach to each other. Consumer and retail buyers, 
suppliers, firms outside the leading groups, and government were all becoming increasingly 
dissatisfied with the existing restrictive practices.   
 
Structural Fracture 
The old order finally began to fracture as the constituency for change continued to widen and 
the pressure intensified. Once the stranglehold of the old leaders was loosened by the 
intervention of government, opportunities for others to seize the initiative were opened up. 
Firms that had long led grocery wholesaling began to be subjected to levels of price 
competition and margin reductions that they were no longer able to withstand given their cost 
structures. The “breakthrough” came earlier in Britain than Ireland. Wholesale innovators 
quickly moved to introduce new service technologies such as group trading and cash and 
carry. In Ireland the leading trade association continued to resist the emerging changes. 
Businesses in both countries learned from developments overseas. Britain learned from the 
USA, whilst Ireland learned, in turn, from the British experience. Nonetheless, both 
industries also saw their relative position decline as non-traditional relationships and 
practices began to emerge among channel members elsewhere along the market chain (direct 
sales by manufacturers, associative buying groups and larger self-service supermarkets 
operated by ever stronger retail multiples). 
 
 Structural Reconfiguration 
The transition from the old to the new order took time. While wholesaling was in flux, some 
of the more enterprising firms set about restoring their fortunes, through the importation of 
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new ideas, formats and service technologies. One feature of this period was the declining role 
of trade associations in both countries. The enhanced focus on the trading/commercial aspects 
of relationships served to undermine any broader solidarity. This new commercial focus 
allowed some wholesalers and independent retailers together to achieve economies of scale 
and scope.  
 
Although there were some important new entrants, many of the firms that succeeded during 
this period were based around long-established players from within the traditional 
wholesaling groupings. As this phase progressed, increasing reconfiguration and 
consolidation occurred through mergers, acquisitions, strategic partnerships and exits. The 
new order began to take more definite shape, with a smaller number of larger organisations in 
both countries. New formats of symbol group trading and cash and carry wholesaling became 
firmly established. However, the management and investment costs associated with group 
trading (as well as their inherent tensions) took their toll and the lower cost format of cash 
and carry increasingly found favour with both retailer and wholesaler. At the end of this 
period the industries in both countries had arrived at a very similar market position.  
 
Structural Consolidation 
The new order continued to consolidate as the new wholesaling formats became more 
dominant.  Both countries experienced an initially strong bias towards cash and carry that 
subsequently reversed as convenience shopping began to grow in importance. However, this 
period is one where the two countries had differing experiences in a number of areas, 
including collective action, regulatory position and industry leadership.  
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In Britain, the retail multiples were given a clear path to dominance through decisions the 
British Government and regulatory authorities made in relation to both competition law and 
planning regulation. Furthermore, unlike the Irish situation, the British wholesale industry 
was unable to improve its margin position through collective action. During the 1970s and 
1980s the role and power of the various independent sector trade associations largely 
dissipated as independent grocery retailing lost almost three-quarters of its national market 
share. Britain also experienced a considerable amount of “churn” among the leading 
wholesale companies, with Booker being the only leading survivor from the mid-1970s.  This 
industry flux made it difficult for “statesmanship” activity 
 
In contrast, the Irish wholesalers re-established an effective forum for collective action 
(IADT) during the late 1970s.  This new association was led by a succession of industry 
“heavyweights”. Having successfully used this forum to recover wholesalers’ margins, it set 
its sight on demanding Government protection for the independent retailing trade and thus its 
supplying wholesalers. By co-opting the independent retailer association RGDATA, the 
combined IADT/RGDATA became one of the most effective lobbying groups in the country. 
Through concerted political action the twin goals of both planning and competitive 
restrictions on multiple traders were achieved. Musgraves and BWG then consolidated their 
position through superiority in strategy, management and capital.  
 
By avoiding a rapid decline in market share in the 1980s and by subsequently winning a 
regulatory umbrella, the independent sector in Ireland remained vibrant enough to capitalise 
rapidly on the emergence of the trend towards convenience. With strong consistent leading 
companies (albeit basically only two of them) applying coherent strategies, the wholesale 
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sector revived and strengthened. In contrast, the British industry was severely weakened over 
the period with strong multiple retailer competition and inconsistent consolidation activities.  
 
The cases can also be considered in the light of the issues raised by the literature on industry 
evolution studies.  The industry life-cycle model appears to be of limited use in explaining 
the pattern of industry evolution that emerges from this study. The pattern observed may 
represent either an insight into the process of maturity and de-maturity within a very 
elongated lifecycle or a distinct pattern of process in its own right. The age of the industries, 
which exceed 150 years at this stage, makes such a judgement difficult. The two industries 
had already been founded and reached a stage of maturity by the start of the period 
considered here.  
 
The life-cycle model is a deterministic perspective that provides little role for actors other 
than firms and drivers other than technology. As such, it does not account for the important 
role played by government, trade associations, co-operation and individual actors, all of 
which are identified in this study.  There is also the presence of what amounts to new cycles 
of innovation during maturity. The data in this study tend to support the Mowray and Nelson 
(1999) view  that ‘theories of industry life-cycles that focus on the evolution of limited 
product classes are of limited use’ in cases where the period covered is long and the product 
range is wide. It also highlights the inadequacy of the life-cycle model in addressing industry 
change during maturity and de-maturity.  
 
There is some evidence to support the notion of a reverse technological lifecycle effect. This 
study demonstrates the way that technologies that emerged from the manufacturing sector 
initially acted to promote greater process efficiencies within both wholesaling and retailing. 
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These escalated over time into new product propositions. The pattern observed is more in line 
with the proposition that enabling technologies go beyond a single technology. What is seen 
here is the emergence over time of a diverse set of enabling technologies from within the 
manufacturing sector, that acted to both drive and facilitate innovation within downstream 
service industries. The need for more detailed process modelling of this stage provides a 
fruitful focus for further research.     
 
 In terms of drivers of evolution a number of specific themes and some wider generalisations 
from the cases are suggested. First, the role of Government actions in relation to both 
competition and to local planning has played a key part in the industry outcomes. 
Government can significantly alter the direction of industry evolution through their action or 
inaction. 
 
Secondly a key factor would seem to be the presence or absence of collective action. 
Throughout the period wholesalers have relied extensively on co-operation as well as 
competition for their development. Some of this activity has been for competitive reasons, in 
areas such as the operation of symbol groups and to increase purchasing scale. However, on 
other occasions trade associations have been used to bring stability and to create political and 
social leverage. Both of these issues have been central to the story of the escalating rate of 
inter-channel competition.  
 
Thirdly, scale has been important in the development and execution of strategy. Activity 
aimed a building a small number of well positioned, independent retailer operated, national 
convenience brands has been critical, though building this scale on a consistent basis both 
vertically and horizontally has not been straightforward. Despite this however the relative 
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size of wholesalers when compared with major retailers or indeed manufacturers remains 
small. Scale has in turn had to be allied to operational efficiency and appropriate use of 
resources. For major retailers this has meant by-passing wholesalers and carrying out or 
organising the wholesale activities themselves. 
 
Fourthly, market based strategies on their own are not enough to successfully compete. It is 
also necessary to develop and engage with non-market strategies.  The development of 
political power and influence has been important in the maintenance of the wholesaling 
sector in Ireland. In Britain such power has been mainly absent and it is only recently that 
activities of this form have become more coherent. 
 
Finally, there is the issue of time. The creation of a set of structures and of businesses within 
these structures takes time. However, most structures also have within them the seeds of their 
own destruction. Considerable effort has thus to be spent on maintaining existing situations. 
If this is not done, then there would seem to be a tendency for structures to be undermined. 
Time of course takes its toll on businesses and individual managers. Currently in Ireland, one 
could argue that dazzled by market success, turnover size and other scale elements, 
wholesalers and independent retailers have forgotten the value of non-market strategies and 
have allowed other influences to drive the political process, thus potentially undermining 
their success.   
 
Conclusions 
Overall this examination of grocery wholesaling in Ireland and Britain since the 1930s 
suggests that there is a discernable pattern of industry evolution. However, it is a pattern of 
regeneration rather than of lifecycle. Furthermore, this evolutionary process is driven by 
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important factors other than technological breakthrough. All of this suggests that the industry 
life cycle model needs to be reconsidered to accommodate significant finer-grained patterns 
within the so called ‘maturity’ phase.   
 
There are some wider observations to be made in conclusion. First, we believe that the 
wholesaling industries examined here demonstrate again (see Fein 1998) that the patterns and 
processes of industry evolution in this service market are different to those in manufacturing 
or technology based industries.  For example, the use of collective action for commercial 
purposes differentiates the evolution of wholesaling from that of many manufacturing 
industries. The way in which industry consolidation and concentration are managed and 
achieved, again appears very different.  
 
Secondly, if wholesaling (or service sectors) is different then we need to develop the correct 
lenses through which to understand their evolution. Quinn and Murray (2005) have pointed to 
the potential of evolutionary approaches for conceptualisation of industry change, but have 
also noted that other more established approaches within organisation theory at the ecological 
level may also have value.  Multi-faceted conceptualisations of wholesale industry change are 
needed. 
 
Finally, there are of course disparities between Ireland and Britain. There is clearly a scale 
issue in economy terms as well as some differences in political, social, technological and 
economic systems and behaviours. Some of the issues we have highlighted reflect perhaps the 
abilities to achieve results in smaller markets. Others would appear to be common trends. It 
would be a major step forward if similar studies, taking similar approaches, but focused on 
grocery wholesaling in other countries e.g. USA, Japan, in Central and Eastern Europe, South 
 26
Africa could be undertaken. By examining the dynamics of processes and patterns in industry 
evolution across countries strides may be taken in conceptualising and understanding the 
issues and the subject. We believe this is much needed. 
 
Notes 
1 – There is a paper to be written utilising the extensive research published to date on retail 
change in Britain during the period under consideration here, and the British case material 
developed during this research programme. However, this is not that paper. In order to 
compare the British and Irish cases, which is the main focus of this paper, in the space 
permitted, we have had to shelve that discussion in favour of a non-referenced tabular case 
study approach. 
 
2 – The authors would like to thank the Institute of Grocery Distribution for allowing access 
for Jim Quinn to their resource centre containing this extensive run of The Grocer. It is 
possible that this source is not going to be available in a similar way in the future. To quote 
Joni Mitchell “You don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone”. 
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Figure 1: The Path of Industry Change in Grocery Wholesaling  
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